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THE NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY: A REPLY TO
JEAN PORTER
GERARD V. BRADLEY
ROBERT GEORGE
The theory of practical reasoning and morality proposed by Germain
Grisez, and developed by him in frequent collaboration with John

Finnis and Joseph Boyle, is the most formidable presentation of
natural law theory in this century. Although work by Finnis and
others has brought this "new natural law theory" (NNLT) to the
attention of secular philosophers, the theory is of particular interest
to Catholic moralists. This is because NNLT provides resources for
a fresh defense of traditional moral norms, including those forbidding
abortion, euthanasia, and other forms of "direct" killing, as well as
sexual immoralities such as fornication, sodomy, and masturbation.
In part, no doubt, because it provides such resources, Catholics who
dissent from the Church's teaching of these norms have criticized
NNLT. Catholic moralists of unassailable orthodoxy (such as the
Thomist philosopher Ralph McInerny) have also challenged the NNLT.
Their disagreements are essentially interpretative. Grisez and his
collaborators locate themselves within the broad framework of the
Thomistic tradition, and have advanced interpretations of Thomistic
texts in support of key claims. Redoubtable Thomists have challenged
those interpretations and, more globally, NNLT's Thomistic
credentials.
Other philosophers, including some non-Catholic natural law
theorists, question NNLT's status as a theory of natural law. Because
NNLT's proponents hold that moral norms cannot be deduced or
inferred purely from antecedent facts about human nature, these
critics say it cannot be a theory of natural law. Because its proponents
eschew a voluntaristic account of moral obligation (and so speak not
of a "lawgiver" but of the claims of reason), and because they
(particularly Finnis) are critical of much natural law theorizing about
the positive law, NNLT is not, critics say, a theory of natural law.
Professor Jean Porter's recent appraisal of NNLT1 avoids all these
familiar grounds of criticism. She challenges "proportionalism" by
1. J. Porter, "Basic Goods and the Human Good in Recent Catholic Moral
Theology" 47 The Thomist (1993), p. 27.
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the same arguments she advances against Grisez and Finnis. 2 She
sketches an alternate position, which she considers broadly Thomistic,
but engages no interpretative issue. Porter apparently rejects the
claim that practical principles (such as moral norms) cannot be
deduced or inferred from purely factual premises, but her disagreement
with Grisez and his collaborators on this point is a minor feature of
her critique. Although there is evidence that she rejects at least some
of the tradition's moral norms, we must assume that this follows
from her criticisms of NNLT, and is not a basis for them.
I.
Professor Porter advances two leading objections to NNLT. One
is that NNLT rests on claims of "self-evidence" which are unwarranted
by any considerations offered by Grisez and Finnis. The claims are,
she says, arbitrary and untrue. The other objection is that NNLT
provides a highly unsatisfactory account of the moral life. It does
so for two reasons. First, Grisez/Finnis "hypostatize" the basic
goods. These goods are therefore unrelated, or related very tenuously,
to human persons. Second and partly as a result, Grisez/Finnis saddle
themselves with "wildly improbable" and "fantastic" substantive
moral positions. So, NNLT cannot be taken seriously as the effective
guide to upright human choice, in the here and now, that it purports
to be.
We are prepared to defend the Grisez/Finnis position against these
criticisms, and are confident that we could successfully do so. We
do not here attempt that defense, however, because Professor Porter
scarcely engages NNLT. We shall show that at every major point
she objects not to its proponents' position, but to a serious
misunderstanding of it. Our aim, then, is not, strictly speaking, to
offer counterarguments. Our task is more basic. We simply identify
some of Porter's larger mistakes in presenting NNLT. In so doing,
we restate the Grisez/Finnis position and, incidentally, detail how
Porter's critical appraisal so misses the mark that it simply fails to
contribute to the vigorous debate about Grisez' project.

2. Without explanation, Porter addresses Grisez and Finnis only, even though
most commentators regard Joseph Boyle's contributions as an essential component
of the theory, including the restatement in the American Journal of Jurisprudence
which, along with Finnis' Natural Law and Natural Rights and Grisez's Way of the
Law Jesus: Christian Moral Principles, Porter identifies as her sources.
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II.
Porter claims that Grisez and Finnis hold that there are "selfevident basic goods." Her article opens [27] by saying that they
"have not made a convincing case" for them. She repeatedly refers
to identification of "self-evident basic goods". [28, 29, 34, etc.] But
Grisez and Finnis do not hold that there are "self-evident basic
goods." Grisez has never spoken that way. Finnis on one occasion
did as a kind of shorthand [Natural Law and Natural Right 64], but
Porter does not cite it. Grisez and Finnis hold instead that the first
principles of practical reason which direct choice and action toward
intelligible purposes which provide noninstrumental reasons for action
(i.e. toward basic human goods) are self-evident. The first principles
are of the type, "knowledge" or "life" or such and such basic good
"is to be pursued, protected, promoted."
Porter's mistake stems partly from careless handling of the relevant
texts. Consider, for example, her use of page 33 of Finnis' Natural
Law and Natural Rights. Her excerpt of it follows:
[The basic human goods] are not inferred from facts. They are
not inferred from metaphysical propositions about human nature,
or about the nature of good and evil, or about 'the function of
a human being,' nor are they inferred from a teleogical conception
of nature, or any other conception of nature. They are not inferred
or derived from anything. They are underived (though not innate).
Principles of right and wrong, too, are derived from these first,
pre-moral principles of practical reasonableness, and not from any
facts, whether metaphysical or otherwise. [29]
The excerpt is accurate, save that what Porter places in brackets
"[t]he basic human goods" substitutes for "they" in Finnis' text.
What are "they"? Here is the entire preceding sentence from Natural
Law and Natural Rights: "On the contrary, Aquinas asserts as plainly
as possible that the first principles of natural law, which specify the
basic forms of good and evil and which can be adequately grasped
by anyone of the age of reason (and not just by metaphysicians),
are per se nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable" [footnote omitted].
Clearly, Finnis is saying in the passage excerpted by Porter that the
first principles, not the basic goods they specify, are self-evident.
Confidence in Porter's handling of texts is further shaken on the
same page of her article. She identifies "[t]he first principle of
practical reasoning (FPPR) as 'Good is to be done and evil is to be
avoided."' But the relevant expression of FPPR (in thirty years of
Grisez's writings and in the works of all the other principal defenders
of NNLT) is "The good is to be done and pursued; the bad is to
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be avoided." On this point proponents of NNLT follow Aquinas
exactly. (See Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a.2.) Porter attributes
to Grisez the position that this "is similarly self-evident to anyone
who has experienced any sort of desire"'. [30-31] She cites Way, p.
178. But neither there nor anywhere else does Grisez (or Finnis) say
such a thing. Grisez's position is well summarized on p. 180 of Way:
The FPPR "articulates the intrinsic, necessary relationship between
human goods and appropriate actions bearing upon them." [180]
Porter's attribution of an epistemology of "desire" is flatly inconsistent
with the passage from NLNR which she herself cited as an explanation
of what "self-evident" means (even if she mistook the subjects of
the claim).
III.
Because the self-evident first principles are pivotal to NNLT, and
because NNLT's reliance upon self-evidence has attracted much
criticism, it is especially important for any commentator to treat the
relevant texts scrupulously. But Porter compounds the errors already
noted. She claims [34] that "each" of what Grisez calls "modes of
responsibility" are "equally self-evident and equally important." But
Grisez makes no such claim. The modes are not self-evident, and
Grisez does not say they are. Each of the modes is derived from the
First Principle of Morality, which states: "In voluntarily acting for
the human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought
to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose
willing is compatible with-a will towards integral human fulfillment."
Having misrepresented Grisez as holding that the modes are selfevident, Porter ignores the arguments for each of the modes that
appears in Chapter 8 of Way. Finally, because the modes have
normative force in different ways, "equally important" (whatever
that might precisely mean) does not describe them.
Porter ascribes [36] to Grisez and Finnis this further claim: it is
"self-evident that it is always irrational, and therefore immoral, to
act in such a way as to destroy or directly impede an instance of
one of these [basic] goods" [my emphasis]. But Grisez and Finnis
never make such a claim. The claim which Porter's mistaken expression
most closely resembles is actually the eighth mode of responsibility,
which differs in a fundamental respect. Where Porter has "act in
such a way," Grisez has "choose to." Later on she will capitalize
on this substitution. Moreover, Grisez and Finnis manifestly do not
hold that it is irrational-much less self-evidently irrational-to choose
to destroy, damage, or impede a basic human good. On the contrary
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they recognize that people will often have a reason (provided by an
opportunity to instantiate another basic good or another instance of
the same basic good) for such a choice. Their position is that such
a choice (though rationally grounded) will nevertheless be unreasonable
(though by no means irrational) because one's reason for it will
always be defeated by a conclusive reason (provided by the moral
norm against it) not to make that choice.'
Porter provides this summary of NNLT's method for identifying
the basic goods. "[I]f we reflect upon the sorts of reasons that
persons give for their actions, we will be led ineluctably to acknowledge
the self-evident moral force of the basic goods towards which those
reasons point." [35] But Grisez and Finnis do not use the term "selfevident moral force," and it is hard to imagine what Porter means
by it. Grisez and Finnis instead hold that if one pushes back in
questioning someone's rational purpose, one will come to reasons
that are primary.
IV.
Porter fares no better in presenting what Grisez and Finnis mean
by "self-evident" than she did in attempting to identify what they
hold to be self-evident. She says that the eighth mode of responsibility
(her version again, not theirs) is not self-evident "in the sense that
there is some obvious absurdity or self-contradiction involved in their
denial". [36-37] But Grisez and Finnis do not hold otherwise. It is
clear from the very passage she excerpts from Natural Law and
Natural Rights that "self-evident" does not mean analytically true.
Grisez and Finnis mean by per se nota that the truth is unmediated
by more basic insights. It is known by knowing the realities to which
the terms refer.
This is but one instance among many where Porter attributes to
Grisez and Finnis a concept of self-evidence foreign to their enterprise.
3. In what Porter herself acknowledges as the major restatement of their theory
cited in the preceeding footnote, Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis explicitly distinguish
irrational acts from acts which, while rationally-grounded (i.e., for a reason), are
nevertheless practically unreasonable (i.e., immoral). In his original presentation of
the theory fifteen years ago in Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis did speak
at one point of the violations of what he called "the requirements of practical
reasonableness" (modes of responsibility) as "irrational" (using the term as synonymous with "unreasonable"). Porter does not, however, cite Finnis' book on this
point, nor could she legitimately do so. Since its publication, Finnis has in numerous
writings made abundantly clear his concurrence with the view held by Grisez, Boyle,
William E. May, Patrick Lee, and the authors of the current article that immoral
acts are not necessarily irrational.
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She says [29] that "once we have some experience of the basic goods,
have felt their attractive power, so to speak, then it becomes evident
to us that these goods are desirable in and of themselves." This
suggests that experience of the basic goods-feeling their attractive
power, "so to speak"-makes it evident that they are desirable. She
is here distorting the Grisez/Finnis story (which is basically the same
as Aquinas'), about natural inclinations as bases for insight into first
practical principles. In doing that, she mistakenly implies that the
desires which correspond to the goods precede insight into them.
They actually hold that the desires, which are volitions, specified by
the basic human goods presuppose insight into them.
Porter, but not Grisez and Finnis, seems to assume something like
the empiricist idea that desires are basic. That collapses the distinction
between reason and emotion as motives for action. Keeping these
different types of motivation analytically distinct is, to put it mildly,
central to NNLT and any other cognitivist account of ethics. Porter
unfortunately capitalizes upon her misattribution. She describes basic
goods as categories of "what we desire" [41] and then criticizes
Grisez/Finnis for arbitrarily excluding, in Porter's words, "one obvious
candidate for what is per se desirable ... namely, physical pleasure."
But they do no such thing. Physical pleasure is not among the basic
goods, because it does not provide an ultimate, intelligible reason
for action. Where pleasure moves people to act it does so not by
appealing to their practical intellectual grasp of a good to be realized,
but rather by appealing to some sentient aspect of themselves. This
does not mean that pleasure is intrinsically evil; it is only to say that
pleasure is not a basic good-it does not provide an ultimate reason
for acting.
Porter compounds this mistake. She speculates [42] about Grisez's
and Finnis' failure to see physical pleasure in its proper relation to
practical reasoning. Though now aimed at an illusory target, her
reference in this diagnostic regard to Kant is particularly unfortunate.
Grisez and Finnis owe their view of the relationship between reason
and emotion almost entirely to Thomas, and not at all to Kant,
whose notion of practical reason excludes anything like principles
which direct choice and action toward basic human goods..Though
Grisez and Finnis insist on analytically distinguishing reasons for
action from emotional motives, they recognize their dynamic unity
in human action. Here, too, they follow Thomas.
V.
Porter introduces her second main line of criticism by wondering
about the "ontological/logical status" of the basic goods. Grisez and
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Finnis, she contends, "tend to speak" as if the goods have an
"independent existence, distinct from the individuals and states of
affairs to which they are somehow tethered." [37] They speak of
"attacking an instance of the basic good of life" rather than of
"harming someone by killing him." [37-38] Porter characterizesand criticizes-this as the "hypostatization" of the basic goods. [37]
Porter charges Grisez and Finnis with holding the view that
"morality is not concerned with human life and nature as they exist
here and now." [31] But this is a caricature. The kernel of truth in
her claim is this: Grisez/Finnis hold that moral truths bear upon
what is to be done, and direct choice towards the goods that can be
realized in human action. Practical reasoning is indeed powerless to
alter the past, and is interested in what people make of the present
through their choices.
Porter seems to suppose that this robs NNLT of ontological
grounding. She advocates as an alternative to NNLT a moral theory
grounded in "philosophical and theological anthropology." The
trouble with this is that (as Aquinas consistently held) one knows
natures from their capacities, the capacities from acts, and the acts
from their objects. So, if one is going to have any knowledge of
specifically human nature, one must understand the objects of
specifically human acts. Now, the objects of action are proposals
which can be adopted by free choices, excluding one or more
alternatives which could have been chosen. Such choices terminate
deliberation, and deliberation is practical reasoning bearing on
alternatives available for choice. So, to understand human nature,
one must understand possible reasons for making choices. And, if
some reasons are derivative, one will understand human nature only
by understanding those reasons' underived principles-the self-evident
truths which refer to the basic human goods.
Porter also seems to think NNLT's acceptance of the is/ought
distinction clears the ontological ground out from under Grisez/
Finnis. She correctly reports that Grisez and Finnis accept the
"familiar" argument that one cannot derive the moral "ought" from
factual premises alone. [30-31] She does not pause to gainsay them
here 4 save to cite a few pages from MacIntyre's After Virtue. But
because Porter seems sympathetic to Maclntyre's idea, which he takes
to be Aristotle's view that man is a functional concept, we note
briefly that Maclntyre's examples (and Porter's by incorporation)the watch and farmer- show only that some evaluative conclusions
4. Though her guiding concept of "integral
Maclntyre than to Grisez.

human good" seems closer to
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may be entailed by factual premises. Grisez/Finnis do not deny that
one can get nonmoral evaluative propositions from theoretical truths.
But that is not to say that factual premises by themselves can entail
moral conclusions, and they do deny that. In any event, it seems
that MacIntyre's functional interpretation of the concept of man is
either a covert appeal to basic human goods which explain the
differentiation of roles (providers, teachers, child nurturers) that in
fact turn up in every human society, or leads to an untenable
relativism.
Porter says [30] that Grisez/Finnis insist on the distinction between
speculative and practical reason because they accept the argument
that no moral conclusions can be drawn from purely factual premises.
There is no ground in their work for the "because" here. They insist
on the distinction because without it morality would be reduced to
nature and such reductionism is bad metaphysics which blocks
understanding of morality. In particular, it is at odds with the truth
that free choice is the principle of the existence of specifically moral
realities-proper human acts, a communion of persons, and so on.
They then defend the irreducibility of morality to nature by pointing
to the logical irreducibility of moral ought to theoretical is.
Throughout the "hypostatization" discussion Porter mishandles
the texts. In the same footnote (14) where she charges
"hypostatization" of the basic goods, she quotes Grisez, Way, 122:
"Bagic human goods are thus greater than the particular things people
do to participate in them." The quotation is accurate, but the context
shows that she has distorted its meaning by asserting that it supports
her "hypostatization" charge. In context, the quoted passage tends
to disprove her charge. Grisez is talking there about the role basic
goods play in the well-being of persons. He criticizes the view that
they are extrinsic to the person. Basic human goods must instead be
considered aspects of what one might call human full being. They
are sought for themselves in the sense that they are judged to be
humanly fulfilling. [Way, 122] Grisez envisions basic goods as shaping
one's character by defining a commitment to, for example, peace
and harmony, that transcends any particular episode of conflict
resolutions. By the same token, the character of an upright physician,
temporarily bereft of patients, is still shaped by his commitment to
the goods of life and health.
Porter's second example of hypostatization misfires as well. She
quotes a passage from the Grisez, Finnis, Boyle, May defense of the
teaching of Humanae Vitae.' That quotation establishes that there is
5. "Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New Life: Toward a Clearer
Understanding," 52 Thomist (1988), pp. 369-90.
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at least this fundamental difference between homicide and
contraception-the latter does not unjustly deprive someone of life
because there is no existing person who is harmed in the basic good
of life by the contraceptive act. But there is, the quotation makes
clear, an essential similarity: each is a contralife act proceeding from
and shaping a nonrationally-grounded contralife will. Porter uses the
excerpt to support this proposition: Grisez and Finnis hold "the
fantastic position that there is no essential difference" between the
will of the murderer and the contracepter. [38] That is fantastic.
Neither Grisez nor Finnis holds it, as the footnote makes abundantly
clear.
Porter may well consider the Grisez/Finnis defense of Humanae
Vitae fantastic, but, if so, she must provide reasons for her judgment,
or she is just begging the question. It seems from her discussion of
"hypostatization" that absent "harm" "to another person," it is
"fantastic," or at least ethereal or platonic, to condemn actions as
immoral. Respectable moral theorists have held to some sort of
"harm to others" test for morality, and Porter may wish to join
their company.
Grisez and Finnis provide an alternative conception. They treat
moral norms as guides for the rectification of the human will, the
will of a person choosing what is to be done. The basic goods have
an ethereal being, so to speak, only to the extent one thinks human
will, choice, and character are ethereal.
For Grisez and Finnis, we can choose immorally without harming
(in any noticeable way) anyone else. How so? Consider the
daydreaming red-blooded male, fantasizing sexual relations with some
movie star, whom he has never-and never will-meet. Our excited
male might next imagine his "perfect ten" female, who is not any
real person at all. This overexcited fellow has integrated his will
around an immoral choice and so determined his character. He is,
morally speaking, a fornicator, though no act of sexual intercourse
has taken place, much less has any harm been done to anyone else.
Denial of the position held by Grisez and Finnis (and many others)
entails that the professor who fantasizes intercourse with all his
students, and who would proposition them all but for fear of
punishment for harassment, stands outside the realm of morality.
How would Porter, for instance, explain traditional condemnations
of "victimless" sexual immoralities like masturbation? Consider
another example. A couple uses a method of birth regulation which
they know to be sometimes abortifacient, intending its effectiveness
in this and other ways. In doing so, they will to kill newly conceived
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human beings, even if, in their case, the method always happens to
prevent conception.
In all these examples, either the choices are morally insignificant,
or morally significant choices do not necessarily depend upon the
concreteness Porter considers essential to avoid "fantastic" claims.
Porter might well regard the condemnations as unjustified, but that
they were widely condemned for millennia, and are still considered
grave matters by the Church, suggests they are hardly "fantastic."
If all this seems too ethereal to Porter, at least Grisez and Finnis
may claim the company of an ancient Palestinian teacher who said,
"I say to you that everyone who looks at a woman lustfully has
already committed adultery with her in his heart."
VI.
There are many other mistakes in Porter's presentation of NNLT.
These include but are not limited to: (1) referring twice [28, 291 to
a pseudoproblem which has nothing to do with their theory: how to
identify the "true" goods from among the seeming goods for which
persons act. What she calls their answer is certainly not, in their
minds, an answer to the question she poses; (2) attributing to Grisez
and Finnis [34] the view that a "rational person will never act
directly" against a basic good. But, if so, actions attacking basic
goods would be irrational: they would not proceed from reasons at
all. Grisez and Finnis hold that it is immoral (not that it is irrational)
to choose to act directly against a basic human good. They recognize
that one may have a reason so to choose, but argue that such a
reason will be defeated by the moral norm which gives one a
conclusive reason to respect every basic human good in every chosen
action; (3) attributing [35] to Finnis a position expounded in Natural
Law and NaturalRights which instead, is Finnis' summary of Thomas
(in reply to an objection by H.L.A. Hart); (4) saying [36] that Grisez
and Finnis hold that the basic goods are "desirable in all
circumstances." On p. 28 she says they hold "that the (true) good
...must be understood as that which is desirable, not only for this
or that individual or in these special circumstances, but desirable per
se, for every individual and in all situations." They say no such
thing. Grisez and Finnis hold that the will be must always be open
to, and that one may never attack, basic goods. But she attributes
to them the far different-and false-positions that (a) people always
have open to them as options actions specified by each and every
good, and (b) that persons always find all these options emotionally
appealing, and so are interested in them; (5) implying that Grisez
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and Finnis hold that truly basic goods "never function as instrumental
goods." [41] Their position is, in fact, precisely the contrary; (6)
claiming [p. 38-39] that Grisez and Finnis appeal to basic goods as
a device to block consequentialist arguments without answering them.
This is, frankly, baffling. Porter acknowledges [45 n. 251 that Grisez
uses the incommensurability argument against consequentialism, and
she seems to regard it as telling.
VII.
With so many confusions in the presentation of NNLT, it is no
wonder that what Porter apparently intends as the decisive
refutations-a series of illustrations-are well off the mark. The
botched job on "no essential difference" between homicide and
contraception is one example. That one simply ignored the relevant
texts. The next one ignores the centrally important distinctiondrawn often (and carefully defended) by Grisez and Finnis but
repeatedly effaced by Porter-between intention and side effect.
Grisez and Finnis hold that no one may uprightly choose to destroy
a basic good. She says, wrongly, that they hold that no one may
"act in such a way" as to harm a basic good.
Porter imagines a bomb threat at the Super Bowl. "Can the police
stop the game and evacuate the stadium?" She imagines their response:
If we apply the logic of the Grisez/Finnis analysis of morality,
they cannot. The football game in progress is an instantiation of
the basic good of a skilled performance, and as such, it cannot
be destroyed or impeded, even to avert a threat to the basic good
of life. I am not saying that Grisez and Finnis would draw this
conclusion, but given their insistence that no instance of a basic
good can be sacrificed, even to preserve another instance of a
basic good, it is difficult to see how they could avoid it. [39]
In fact, it is easy to see how they would "avoid it." True, the
police have a reason not to interfere: one may not choose to destroy,
impede or impair a skillful performance as such. But one mayhere, should-choose to clear the stadium to protect people's lives
by moving them out of harm's way. Their doing so incidentally
disrupts play of the game, but that is no part of the proposal they
adopt by choice. One can distinguish what is chosen-that which,
whether as means or end, is part of one's plan adopted by choice
and thus integrated into one's will-from what is accepted as side
effect by asking: if presented an option in which the threat to life
could be averted without the effect of halting play, where presented,
would I choose it?
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Porter offers a hypothetical reconstruction of the Grisez/Finnis
position [39-401 to save them from the "wildly improbable" Super
Bowl debacle. The reconstructed position scarcely resembles their
view, but then Porter offers two counter examples to rebut it. One
founders on her confusion between choosing for a basic good and
thereby "acting in such a way" to permit harm to another. Porter
offers the example of a terminally ill patient on the verge of a
prolonged coma who decides against being "kept alive artificially."
[40] Porter notes "nothing obviously irrational" in that response,
even if there is no prospect of pain or of survivors who would suffer
from seeing a loved one in a comatose state.
Porter supposes this response to be contrary to the Grisez/Finnis
claim that life is always a reason for action. Life is always a reason
for action. So the patient has a reason to say "yes." But he may
well have reasons to say "no," besides those mentioned by Porter.
The patient may, for example, simply prefer that available resources
be used on somebody else. There may be an emotional motive in the
picture. Envisioning oneself in a comatose state, equipment chugging
away, is hardly edifying. Grisez and Finnis would say there is no
single uniquely correct answer, as far as the problem is described.
One acts immorally if emotional revulsion causes one to choose death
over life. But one could "act in such a way" that one died by
choosing that the resources benefit another-and thus serve the good
of their life or health-accepting as a side effect (perhaps even
emotionally welcome side effect) one's own death. Here, one's death,
though foreseeable, is not chosen as end or means. It is in no sense
(unless one is merely deceiving oneself) the object of one's choice,
or the reason for one's action.
The other example [40] puts you in the supermarket checkout with
lots of time and nothing to do. A tabloid headline catches your eye:
"Princess Di Is Having Affair With Michael Jackson!" You have
no apparent reason not to read it. "Does it follow that you have a
rationally compelling motive to act in order to obtain this bit of
knowledge?" Porter says not. There is nothing "patently irrational"
in so responding.
Indeed! Nothing in NNLT suggests otherwise. Porter suggests that
according to Grisez and Finnis one is somehow obliged to act on
every possible instantiation of each basic good, save when some
(more compelling?) reason prevents it. Grisez and Finnis manifestly
do not hold that view. They hold that besides a reason for actiona "bit of knowledge" -there must be some emotional motivation in
any human action. The hypothetical supposes there is none, and the
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action will simply not follow. That one has a reason for action is
not a requirement that the action be performed.
CONCLUSION

Porter's critique of NNLT distorts the position of its principal
exponents to the point of caricature. Where she supplies cogent
reasons for rejecting certain positions, these are invariably positions
that Grisez, Finnis, and other defenders of NNLT do not hold.
Often, they are positions that these thinkers explicitly reject.

